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Legal
Developments
Auditors’ Liability to Investors for Clients’ Inadequate Disclosure
or
The Auditor as Police Dog
Dr. Patrica C. Elliott, CPA
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington
GUEST WRITER: This column was written by
Margaret R. Liles, a staff auditor with the
Seattle office of Price Waterhouse & Co.
The article is in two parts; the first part
appeared in the April 1976 issue.

Since Part I of this article was written, the
U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder1 reversing the
decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed in Part I. The court
ruled that a private cause of action for
damages will not lie against an accountant
under Rule 10b-5 in the absence of allega
tion and proof of "scienter," i.e., intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud on the
part of the accountant. The Court noted
that the language of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 connoted
intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud investors, and that an
accountant cannot be liable for negligent
conduct alone. The Court expressly re
served decision, however, as to whether
or not in some circumstances reckless
behavior would be sufficient for liability,
so that actual knowledge may not be the
test as long as the defendant recklessly
ignores what is under his or her nose.
Thus, since Part I of this article was
written, the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Hochfelder decision may have decreed that
the accountant-police dog's nose need not
be that of a bloodhound, thereby substan
tially reducing the importance of the “sniff
function" as outlined in Part I. On the
other hand, although significant, one de
cision does not make the law, and it will
undoubtedly be years before a body of law
defining the limits and implications of the

(Part 2)

Hochfelder decision will be developed. In
any event, the "bark" and "bite"
functions discussed below depend on ac
tual knowledge, or something akin to it, so
that the "scienter" requirement of the
Hochfelder decision will probably be met in
the circumstances discussed under these
captions.

The Bark Function —
Accountant's Liability for
Inadequate or Improper
Presentation
Even when an auditing firm has per
formed an unusually extensive and dili
gent audit of a client's financial transac
tions and has issued a qualified opinion
despite strong client objections, it appears
that the accountant may still be liable to
investors for their losses for failure to
make adequate disclosure about the
client's financial condition and the facts
which prompted the qualified opinion in
its report on the audited financial state
ments. In the case of Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath2 the Court
held the auditors liable to investors under
Rule 10b-5 for issuing a misleading report
on the audited financial statements of its
client. The holding of the Court is disturb
ing because the decision extends what
constitutes adequate disclosure beyond
the reporting standards required by gen
erally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), because of the dicta of the Court
to the effect that compliance with GAAP
does not necessarily assure adequate dis
closure, and because of the reasons the
Court used to justify its holding the au
ditors liable.

In the Herzfeld case the accounting firm
of Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Hor
wath (Laventhol) had been retained by the
Firestone Group, Ltd., (FGL), a California
real estate syndicate, to perform an audit
pursuant to a private placement of $7.5
million of securities by FGL. The audited
financial statements and Laventhol's qual
ified opinion on the financial statements
were found misleading because of the
accounting treatment accorded to the pur
chase and sale of certain nursing home
properties (the Monterey transaction), the
largest single transaction of FGL. Several
members of the auditing firm went to
extraordinary lengths to review the
Monterey transaction, even obtaining an
outside legal opinion on the contracts.
Because they established the facts that the
down payments were small, that the pur
chaser had a net worth of only $100,000,
that no title search or title insurance had
been obtained, and that the transaction
was doubtful, they required — despite
objections by both the client and the
underwriter — that the FGL defer most of
the profit ($1.65 million) and allowed the
client to take into income only the actual
cash received and the amount promised as
liquidated damages if the buyer defaulted
($235,000). Laventhol further issued only
a qualified opinion “subject to the collecti
bility of the balance receivable on the
contract of sale," and provided a detailed
description of the contracts in the foot
notes to the financial statements. It later
turned out that the properties were never
acquired or sold by FGL and the company
recognized a substantial loss instead of a
profit.
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The Court held Laventhol liable because
it had included the Monterey transaction
in sales and income and had not fully
revealed to investors its reservations and
doubts concerning consummation of the
transaction and the facts upon which its
reservations were based.3 In other words,
Laventhol was faulted for not barking long
and loud enough to warn the unwary
investor when Laventhol came upon sus
picious circumstances. The Court focused
on what would have constituted adequate
disclosure under the circumstances and
specifically stated that the qualification
language in the auditor's opinion was
inadequate. The court said:
"Our inquiry is not focused on
whether Laventhol's report satisfies
esoteric accounting norms, com
prehensible only to the initiate, but
whether the report fairly presents the
true financial position of Firestone ... to
the untutored eye of an ordinary inves
tor."4 [Emphasis supplied].
The Court held further that Laventhol had
an affirmative duty of disclosure because it
knew its report was being made exclu
sively for the private placement and be
cause it knew investors were relying on
Laventhol "as a public accounting firm, to
reveal the truth about FGL's financial con
dition."5 [Emphasis supplied]. Such lan
guage appears to make the auditor the
insurer of a client's financial statements.
Moreover, the auditor's reporting is to be
judged from the perspective of hindsight
by the standard of whether adequate dis
closure was made of all facts investors
needed to interpret the financial state
ments accurately rather than whether pro
fessional standards were met.6 The fun
damental objection of the Court appears to
be that Laventhol allowed FGL to include
any of the proceeds from the Monterey
transaction in current income, given that
they had substantial doubts about the
enforceability of the contract and did not
require as a condition to the audit a written
opinion by an attorney experienced in real
estate transactions.
In sum the court, despite all its words
about inadequate disclosure, appears to
fault Laventhol principally for insufficient
investigation and poor judgment, and
perhaps for yielding to client pressure to
bend the rules in its favor. To expose
auditors to liability to investors for what
from the benefit of hindsight turns out to
be poor judgment, even though made in
accordance with standards of the account
ing profession, is an unprecedented ex
tension of auditor's liability. Perhaps in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in
the Hochfelder case, the district court in the
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Herzfeld case went too far. However, it is
evident that, on the authority of the
Herzfeld case at least, in the event a com
pany's financial transactions turn sour
and investors suffer losses and are unable
to recoup them from the company, the
courts would scrutinize the auditing and
reporting practices followed by the com
pany's auditor in an attempt to impose
liability on the auditor. In effect, to protect
an auditor from civil liability, the financial
statements would have to be written like a
prospectus. It is difficult to believe that
decision is really a fair statement of the law
and would have been upheld on appeal;
but the case was not appealed and thus
allowed to stand and cannot be ignored by
accountants although its requirements are
extreme.
In any event, it is evident under the
authority of the Herzfeld case that the
auditor must not only bark loudly but he
must also bark clearly when confronted
with potential audit dangers, and the
traditional qualification language used in
auditors' opinions may not constitute a
clear enough bark.

The Bite Function —
Accountant's Liability for
Failure to Alert Authorities
The position of the SEC in its complaint
against National Student Marketing Cor
poration (NSMC)7 would extend an au
ditor's liability for aiding and abetting a
Rule 10b-5 violation to failure to notify
shareholders or the SEC in the event that
unaudited interim financial statements are
materially misleading. The SEC contends
that Peat, Marwick & Mitchell (PMM),
who, pursuant to a merger between
NSMC and Interstate National Corpora
tion (Interstate), issued a comfort letter
requiring material adjustments on the
interim statements, had a duty to with
draw from the engagement and to notify
the Commission or the NSMC and In
terstate shareholders when NSMC failed
to revise its interim statements in accor
dance with the comfort letter. Even
though the Interstate representatives and
counsel were aware of the deficiencies in
the comfort letter and decided to proceed
with the closing of the merger nonethe
less, the SEC position is that PMM should
have, in order to avoid personal liability,
withdrawn from the engagement and in
formed on the client to agents of the
government. Thus, the SEC expects au
ditors to sink their fangs into the hand that
feeds them if their client turns out to be the
thief.
If the SEC's position in this pending
action is upheld, and accountants are
required to perform an enforcement func

tion in connection with unaudited finan
cial statements which they believe to be
materially misleading, they will be ex
posed to greater responsibilities, duties,
and thus liabilities, than proscribed by the
standards of the profession, which recog
nizes such a duty only in connection with
audited financial statements.8
Although the final outcome in the Na
tional Student Marketing actions remains to
be seen, there is some precedent for the
SEC's position in an earlier Seventh Cir
cuit holding in Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Insurance Company,9 which had
certain similarities to the SEC complaint in
National Student Marketing, although no
accountant was involved. In that case the
Court held that silence or inaction alone is
not enough to incur liability for aiding and
abetting a violation of the anti-fraud pro
visions of the securities laws; but if some
benefit is received directly or indirectly by
the person who fails to disclose knowl
edge of another's securities fraud upon
the public to the proper regulatory au
thorities, then such silence or inaction
might constitute rendering substantial as
sistance to the fraud of another and result
in liability on an aider and abettor theory.
(The Supreme Court in the Hochfelder case
expressly declined to prescribe the criteria
for aiding and abetting under Rule 10b-5.)
Although the Brennan case does not
involve an accountant as an aider and
abettor, the case has important implica
tions for accountants for it established the
conditions under which silence could con
stitute aiding and abetting. One can easily
imagine a situation in which by hindsight
an accountant would be deemed to have
known about a client's fraudulent activi
ties but would be under no statutory duty
to report such activities to the regulatory
authorities. For example, a client could
make a misleading press release having
nothing to do with either audited or "as
sociated with" financial statements. The
fee received by the accountant probably
would be viewed as a sufficient benefit to
make him or her liable, for clearly if the
accountant were to turn in the client to the
authorities s/he would lose the client,
future fees, and perhaps uncollected fees
for previously rendered services if the
regulatory authorities should thwart a
pending financial transaction upon whose
successful completion payment of such
fee was dependent.
It is significant that the Brennan court
did not purport to find a specific statutory
duty to take action to prevent the fraud,
but emphasized investor protection as the
paramount consideration of the federal
securities laws in general, and specifically
of the Exchange Act.10 Since the primary

wrongdoer was insolvent, as is often the
case, the party found guilty of aiding and
abetting the fraud is liable for the inves
tor's losses. Accountants faced with civil
liability and large damages as aiders and
abettors should note that active assistance
of another's fraud is not a necessary factor
in such liability — silence or inaction can
constitute substantial assistance. The risk
of liability for failure to notify the SEC
and/or the public of the misleading nature
of previously issued financial statements
with which an accountant is associated is
substantial.

Shifting the Liability Burden —
Indemnification, Insurance
and the Investing Public
One approach accountants might take to
meeting the increased standards for liabil
ity would be to attempt to shift the burden
contractually to the client by an agreement
of indemnification. Unfortunately, under
the doctrine of Globus v. Law Research
Services, Inc.,11 an agreement for indem
nification for violation of the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws is void as
against public policy. The reasoning be
hind this doctrine is that liability is im
posed under the securities laws as an
incentive to greater diligence to sniff out
and disclose violations of the law, and any
indemnification by the defrauding person
would substantially reduce this desirable
incentive.
Although no cases on the subject exist,
malpractice insurance covering liabilities
under the securities laws would seem to
stand on a different footing than indem
nification. Insurance may reduce some
what the incentive toward professional
diligence; however, unlike indem
nification, insurance provides an
additional pool of funds which may be
used to repay a defrauded investor, so that
recovery on a contract of insurance does
not result in taking funds from one of the
investor's pockets (the client company in
which the investor is a stockholder) and
putting it into another.
Premium costs for accountant malprac
tice insurance with securities laws cover
age have increased substantially in recent
years and will probably increase even
more in the future. Further, inclusion of
securities laws violations in policy cover
age has become difficult for small account
ing firms to obtain. Accountants' malprac
tice insurance policies are generally
worded to protect the insured only against
claims or actions for "damage” and thus
do not cover defense of criminal proceed
ings, or similar actions in which "damage"
recoveries are not sought. Also, because
accountant malpractice insurance policies

are designed to protect only against dam
age claims, an insurance carrier is not
obligated to consider possible damage to
professional reputation or future business
in weighing the desirability of an early
settlement.12
Because the new standards will require
public accountants to spend greater
amounts of time and effort in their review,
and because the increased costs of mal
practice insurance will ultimately have to
be shifted to the client, the average cost of
accounting fees which businesses will
bear in the future will certainly be signifi
cantly higher than in the past. Thus,
American businesses, and ultimately their
public stockholders, will ultimately and
indirectly bear the burden of the increased
costs associated with the increased
standards of professional performance
imposed upon accountants under the re
cent securities laws cases.
For smaller, riskier companies, the
"marginal" companies with declining
earnings, these increased costs may be a
substantial burden and may increase the
tendency for such companies to forego
public accounting services whenever pos
sible. These, however, are the very types
of companies for which public accoun
tants must exercise extended diligence
under the new requirements and are
probably the types of clients that need
good accounting services.
Moreover, even the largest and most
solvent companies cannot afford to have
auditors employ all possible audit proce
dures that might lead to the detection of
collusive fraud by management. Hence,
there is some doubt that public investors
would be protected from many of the
headline-making types of fraud, such as
occurred in the Equity Funding scandal.

Since the standards for liability and thus
for investigation vary with the facts of
each case, it is difficult to establish any
fixed procedures for investigation and
review that an accountant should under
take in order to escape liability under the
new standards. CPAs are exposed to in
creased liability to investors for in
adequate investigation, misapplication of
accounting principles and inadequate or
misleading disclosures which are mate
rially misleading and operate to deceive
investors. The evolving standard for a
public accountant's liability to investors is
increasingly demanding and at present
vague. However, it is clear that the
standards have increased and thus more
review is needed and that, if a substantial
fraud lies under an accountant's nose, s/he
will be liable no matter how carefully the
routine checks traditionally required have
been performed. It is doubtful that the
Supreme Court's decisions in the Hochfel
der case has changed this as a practical
matter. Shoddy performance or "rubber
stamping" of a client's disclosures even if
tolerable in the past will render public
accountants vulnerable to Rule 10b-5 lia
bility and will thus force the accounting
profession to employ a higher level of care
(Continued on IBC)

University of Massachusetts
at Amherst
is seeking faculty additions
in accounting.

Conclusion
There is no question that in recent years
massive frauds on the investing public
have been uncovered. Some of them
probably would not have progressed as far
had greater diligence in uncovering and
disclosing them been exercised by the
public accountants involved. In retro
spect, accountants probably should have
been more active and diligent in identify
ing the frauds and less motivated toward
pleasing their clients. Whether or not
applied standards of review are deemed to
fall within or without generally accepted
auditing standards and accounting prin
ciples is irrelevant — clearly new
standards of greater review are required of
the accounting profession, whether by the
profession itself, the administrative agen
cies, or the courts.

Preference will be given to persons holding
the Ph.D. or D.B.A. degree or persons close
to securing degree. Positions available in the
financial, managerial, auditing and tax areas.
Representatives will be available at the AAA
Convention in Atlanta in August. The Univer
sity is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Ac
tion employer. Send resumes to:
Professor Anthony Krzystofik,
Chairman, Department of Accounting,
School of Business Administration,
University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, Mass. 01002.
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Education
(Continued from pg. 15)
agencies. Women may file complaints
with a number of different agencies simul
taneously.

Elements of Desirable
Affirmative Action Plans
Prior to making a career commitment to a
university teaching position, a candidate
may want to study the affirmative action
plan of the particular university for the
following elements:19
1. Statement that the university will
follow nondiscriminatory policies.
2. Statement that the president or chief
campus officer has responsibility for af
firmative action.
3. Delegation of responsibility by the
president to a top campus official for
development and implementation of af
firmative action policies.
4. Provision for a full-time affirmative
action officer with functions carefully de
veloped.
5. Provision for an affirmative action
committee(s) with membership deter
mined in consultation with affected
groups on campus and with functions
carefully developed.
6. Provision for dissemination of the
affirmative action plan to all persons as
sociated with the institution.
7. Presentation of data on employment
of faculty, nonfaculty academic person
nel, and nonacademic personnel related
to:

a. Racial and sexual composition by
department and rank for the most
recent three or four years.
b. Pools of qualified persons by race
and sex for each academic field.
c. Goals and timetables for appro
priate campus units.
8. Statement of nondiscriminatory re
cruitment and selection procedures with
provision for maintaining records.
9. Provision for review of each ap
pointment by appropriate administrators,
including the top campus official having
responsibility for affirmative action.
10. Provision for nondiscriminatory
procedures in promotion.
11. Provision for salary analyses to de
termine if inequities exist based on sex or
race.
12. Provision for development of
adequate grievance procedures.

Conclusion
Increasingly university personnel are rec
ognizing that they are depriving them
selves of a large reserve of potential
scholars and teachers by not actively seek
ing qualified women for faculty positions.
The federal government is involved in
enforcement of nondiscrimination and af
firmative action in higher education
through the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Execu
tive Order No. 11246, Revised Order No.
4, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of

1972, and other similar legislation. The
time is "right" for increasing numbers of
women to consider careers in accounting
education.
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to assure fair presentation and adequate
disclosure. Compliance with professional
standards and customs will not necessar
ily protect accountants if they do not meet
the fair presentation standard or if it is
determined that, because of their unique
position of trust, they should have gone
beyond the reporting standards of the
profession in order to assure adequate
disclosure.
Accountant may not escape these new
responsibilities by attempting to shift
them to client through indemnification,
nor is reliance upon increased malpractice
insurance wholly satisfactory. The only
acceptable alternative is to face their new
responsibilities directly and use their best
efforts to do an independent and careful

professional job with every effort to main
tain their independence and integrity free
from any improper influence by the client.
This should not be viewed as attempting
to teach an old dog new tricks but, rather,
as practicing and perfecting tricks that
have been with them since dog school.
Only by careful discipline can our police
dog be assured that it will not wind up in
the pound.
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